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Abstract
We first report three empirical findings from our survey on the contracting-out
of municipal waste collection services in Japan: 1) the rate of contracting-out and
the contract price are inversely related, 2) this inverse relationship tapers out as the
contracting rate becomes sufficiently high, and the contract price even tends to go
up as the contracting rate approaches 100%, and 3) there is a significant disparity
in the contracting rates between the eastern and western parts of Japan. In order
to account for these observations, we then set up a simple analytical model and
examine its implications. Also, we discuss the issues that a potential hold-up situ-
ation could give rise to when the services are completely contracted out to private
firms.
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1 Introduction
Since around the 1980’s, the contracting-out of household waste collection services to
private firms has been widely promoted in Japan. As in many other countries, local
authorities are legally responsible for the collection and disposal of household waste.
In Japan, contracting-out was encouraged primarily to ease the burden of municipal
governments, which were sometimes financially troubled, by reducing the operating cost
of waste collection services in general. This trend was further strengthened during the
90’s when Japan experienced a prolonged recession and also when the privatization and
contracting-out of “blue-collar” public services, including waste collection and disposal,
became even more fashionable among many developed nations.
There exist a number of empirical studies that identify significant cost savings from
contracting out municipal waste collection services to private contractors. Based on the
observations of 340 public and private firms in the US, Stevens (1978) indicated a cost
decrease of 7 to 30% due to the contracting-out. For a sample of 205 Canadian cities,
McDavid (1985) reported that public collection was 41% more expensive than private
collection. Domberger et al. (1986) estimated the cost savings of 22% for contracting out
household refuse collection in the UK. Reeves and Barrow (2000) showed that there is
an enormous cost saving opportunity of around 45% for Ireland. Dijkgraaf and Gradus
(2003) identified the cost savings of approximately 15 to 20% for the Netherlands.
In contrast with the abundance of works that report cost reduction possibilities, it is
not clearly understood what are the sources of these significant cost reductions. Some
argue that lower costs have been achieved at the expense of service quality and the terms
and conditions of the workforce rather than greater efficiency. This is referred to as the
“quality-shading hypothesis” in the literature (Domberger et al. 1997). On the other
hand, others emphasize that lower costs have been achieved through higher productivity
which in turn are attributed to competition (Cubbin et al. 1987).
Moreover, few focuses on what determines the political decision-makers’ choice be-
tween private and public firms (Ohlsson 2003). As we will see below for the case of
household waste collection services in Japan, contracting-out is not necessarily an all-
or-nothing deal. That is, it is often the case that a local government contracts out a
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certain portion of services to private firms but still keeps its own public operation unit
despite the overwhelming evidence that contracting-out would results in significant cost
reductions. To the best of our knowledge, this intermediate case has not been addressed
directly in the literature.
In order to shed new lights on these issues, we conducted a survey as regards the
contracting-out of household waste collection services in Japan and report its main find-
ings in the next section. In section 3, we set up a simple analytical model and examine
its implications for gaining insights into not only the way the contracting-out rate and
the contract price are related but also the reason why there exists a significant regional
disparity between the eastern and western parts of Japan. In the ensuing section, we
briefly discuss the issues associated with a potential hold-up situation when the services
are completely contracted out, and the final section concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Findings
For our particular purposes, unfortunately, there exist some critical problems in publicly-
available data. The most comprehensive data source concerning the waste collection
services in Japan is an annual official survey published by the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment.1 In their survey, however, the waste from households and that from private
enterprises are not distinguishable although municipalities are only responsible for col-
lecting household waste in practice.2 This feature simply renders it impossible to make
a legitimate comparison of the costs of household waste collection across municipalities
by using the data from this survey.
In order to obtain information on the status of the contracting-out of waste collection
services, in 2004 we sent out questionnaires to 695 local municipalities across Japan and
received 412 responses in total. Especially, we were interested in the relationship between
the extent of the contracting-out and the contract price. The data are plotted in Figure
1, excluding the ones with zero percent of contracting-out as we have no contract price
1The data is available at http://www.env.go.jp/recycle/waste tech/ippan/index.html (in Japanese).
2It was also the case that the cost of waste collection and the other costs of waste disposal, such as
the costs of incineration and landfill were reported collectively in their survey. But, this problem was
corrected very recently.
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for those municipalities. The curve shown in Figure 1 is the regression line, estimated
by a quadratic equation with respect to the contracting rate (rate) with the contracting
price (price) as a dependent variable. The estimation results based on these 244 samples
can be summarized as follows:
price = 29, 183.95− 47, 674.86× rate+ 31, 885.08× rate2,
(10.915) (−5.234) (4.576)
where the numbers in the parentheses are associated t-values. The value of the adjusted
R2 is 0.122.
As we can see in Figure 1, in general there is an inverse relationship between the
contracting-out rate and the contract price. Moreover, the regression line indicates that
this inverse relationship tapers out as the contracting rate increases, and the contract
price even moves up eventually as the contracting rate approaches 100%. In the following
sections, we discuss how these phenomena can be accounted for.
The other intriguing observation from our survey data is that there are significant
disparities in the contracting-out rates across municipalities, despite the widely promoted
campaigns for contracting-out many blue-collar services in Japan and the overwhelming
empirical evidences that the contracting-out will provide a municipality with important
cost saving opportunities. Moreover, dividing the data on contracting-out rates between
the eastern and western parts of Japan, we have found a notable disparity as we can see in
Figure 2. Apparently, Western Japan is lagging far behind Eastern Japan in contracting
out whereas we do not see any obvious differences that could account for this observation,
such as the costs of waste collection services, both technologically and geographically.
We speculate that this difference is partly attributable to two major cases of social
discrimination in Japan. One of them dates back to the feudal era in Japan. “Buraku-
min”, or, an outcast group at the bottom of the Japanese social order, have historically
been the victims of severe discrimination and ostracism. Many of the group members
have been traditionally engaged in occupations that are associated with death, such as
slaughterhouses, butchers and tanners, and those that are considered “impure”. Collect-
ing and Disposing of waste and human excrement and urine fall into the latter category.
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The other group that has been severely discriminated are “Zai-nichi”, or, the legal Ko-
rean residents in Japan, most of whose ancestors were forcibly brought to Japan from the
Korean peninsula during the period of Imperial Japan. Due to the persistent and wide-
spread discrimination, their occupational choices have also been extremely limited even
long after WWII, and often overlapped with those traditionally occupied by Buraku-min,
including waste collection services.
The issues surrounding these two particular cases of discrimination have been consid-
ered as a very sensitive subject in the post-war Japan. In particular, we have extremely
scarce data as regards the status of the Buraku-min. A notable exception is a nation-
wide survey on their social and economic status conducted by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications (1993). The data clearly reveals that the group of people
categorized as Buraku-min reside far more numerously in the western part of Japan than
its eastern part.3 On the other hand, as for the legal Korean residents in Japan, there
are official data published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications each
year.4 It also clearly shows that they resides quite disproportionally in the western part
of Japan.
As an alleged counter-measure against the persistent discrimination, in 1975 the Diet
enacted “Gotoku-ho”, or, “the Act on Special Measures concerning Streamlining of Do-
mestic Waste Disposal Business Incidental to Improvement of Sewerage”. The law was
intended to encourage local municipalities to provide financial and occupational sup-
ports for those who became redundant due to the spread of improved sewage systems
around that time in Japan. Many of those engaged in sewage-related business joined the
waste collection section of municipal governments with better incomes and greater job
securities.5 On the contrary to the term “streamlining”, this particular law has been oc-
casionally used in court as a rationale to protect the working conditions of those engaged
in this line of work at both public and private enterprises, even after some of those work-
3Unfortunately, the data are aggregated at the prefecture level, which makes it impossible to look
closer into the correlations at the municipal level
4The data for 2012 can be obtained at http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001111233
although they are aggregated at the prefectural level as well.
5For instance, the mayor of Kyoto admitted that, in making recruiting decisions of waste-related
workers, the city have continuously given special priority to members of Buraku-min (Nihon Keizai
Shinbun 2006).
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ers moved out to private contractors as the waves of privatization and contracting-out
hit Japan in the 1980’s.
In the next section, we argue that a higher contracting price and a lower contracting-
out rate in Western Japan in general can be attributed partly to this discrimination and
the associated counter-measures in recent decades.
3 The Model
In this section, we set up a simple analytical model with a local government and private
contractors in order to gain some insights into how household waste collection services
are contracted out and, especially, how the size of the contracting price is related to the
degree of contracting-out in a municipality. For simplicity, we focus on a case where the
local government has all the bargaining power in the contracting process by enabling the
government to commit to the contracting-out price it independently chooses. Thus, we
essentially assume the competitive behavior of each firm and ignore the possibility of a
collusion among firms.6
We first consider the short-term framework where the number of contracting firms
is fixed, and then, relax this assumption later. Throughout this section, we adopt the
assumption of complete information.
3.1 The Case with a Fixed Number of Firms
Our model here is a simple two-stage game where the local government moves first by
setting the contracting price and then private firms choose the amount of waste they would
become responsible for. We suppose that the local government attempts to minimise the
cost of collecting the total amount of household waste, W , that is generated during
one time period, including the payment of the fee to private contractors. Hence, the
6We also assume away any detailed decision-making procedures, such as a type of tendering process.
This assumption is rather innocuous here as we suppose complete information and the existence of
multiple firms in this section. In her seminal work, Stevens (1978) comments “[a]s there are few barriers
to entry in the refuse collection industry, the price charged by private firms is expected to tend to the
competitive solution”. However, the combination of asymmetric information and a small number of firms
could cause an important issue as we discuss in section 4.
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government is concerned solely about the size of its own expense to collect the total
municipal waste.7 The government can either collect the waste on its own or contract
out the task to contractors.
The government has the technology that is represented by a cost function of a quadratic
form, cG(w) =
1
2
αw2 + β, where α and β are positive constants and w is the amount of
waste the government itself collects. If each firm contracts the amount of waste given by
q and there are N firms in the market, we have w = W − Nq. The local government
knows that those contractors have a different type of collection technology than that of
the government and it is represented by the following cost function: cF (q) =
1
2
γq2 + η,
where γ and η are positive constants. Throughout this section, we assume that this cost
function is uniform across all the firms in one municipality and completely and correctly
known by the local government. We suppose α > γ, which reflects the fact that private
firms typically incur much smaller operating cost in the collection activities.8 Also, as for
the lump-sum parts of the cost functions, we suppose β > η, as a significant portion of
those engaged in the waste collection service are usually employed on a long-term basis at
both public and private enterprises, and, as public servants, public workers are generally
paid at a much higher rate than those employed by private firms throughout Japan.9
Whereas the values of β are almost the same since the wages of local public servants in
Japan are almost perfectly regulated by the central government,10 the actual values of η
could vary significantly across municipalities. We consider that policy interventions in the
waste collection markets are reflected, most importantly from our analytical viewpoint,
by a larger lump-sum cost of waste collecting operation. As we mentioned in the previous
section, there is a special objective that the “Gotoku-ho” in Japan has intended to serve
7As the government’s objective in choosing whether to privatize its service or not, Sappington and
Stiglitz (1987) mention three criteria; economic efficiency, equity, and rent extraction. Our assumption
here does not address the second and third criteria at all, and is even different from the first objective
in that the local government only cares about the size of its total expense.
8Using the data on prices of trucks used for waste collection in Sweden, Ohlsson estimated that private
firms pay 10-15% less than public enterprises.
9Based on his own interviews as regards the working conditions of workers engaged in waste collection
services in several cities in the vicinity of Osaka, Japan, Miki (2004) reports that an public-sector
employee is generally paid about 70-80% more than its private counterpart with much stronger job
securities. As for other capital goods,
10Certain regional disparities, such as price levels, are taken into account, but to a very small extent.
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implicitly, i.e., to protect the working conditions of a certain group of people who are
traditionally engaged in this line of work even with private contractors. As the workers
are generally on long-term labour contracts, a larger value of the lump-sum cost of doing
business for a private firm is partly an indication that the share of this group is greater
and such an intent of the law is more strongly upheld in such a municipality.
The local government tries to solve the following expenditure minimisation problem
by choosing the contracting price, p:
min
p
pNq +
1
2
α (W −Nq) 2 + β, (1)
where the first term is the total payment of the contracting fee, and the sum of the second
and third terms is the collection cost. In the second stage, each contractor observes the
choice of p by the government in the first stage, and tries to maximise its own profit as
a price-taking firm. The profit of the contractor, pi, is given by:
pq −
(
1
2
γq2 + η
)
. (2)
The first-order condition for the profit maximisation is:11
p− γq = 0⇒ q = p
γ
. (3)
Correctly anticipating each firm’s choice of q in (3), the local government chooses p so as
to solve (1) with this particular value of q. Then, the first-order condition is:
2p∗ · N
γ
+ α
(
W − p
∗N
γ
)(
−p
∗N
γ
)
= 0 ⇒ p∗ = αγ
2γ + αN
·W, (4)
where p∗ signifies the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium level of the contracting price.
We can easily confirm that p∗is increasing in α and γ, respectively. Inserting (4) into p
in (3), we have:
q∗ =
α
2γ + αN
·W, (5)
where q∗ is the equilibrium amount of the waste collected by one firm. Finally, the “rate
11The second-order conditions hold throughout this paper.
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of contracting-out” in this subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, r∗, can be found as:
r∗ =
N · q∗
W
=
αN
αN + 2γ
. (6)
As is shown in (6), the equilibrium contracting-out rate does not depend on W , i.e., the
total amount of waste. Thus, the size of a municipality itself does not make a difference
in the chosen contracting rate.
On the other hand, we can easily obtain the value of q that minimises the social cost
of collecting the total waste, denoted by qO, as:
qO =
α
αN − γ ·W. (7)
By comparing (5) and (7), we can immediately obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1. It is always the case that the equilibrium contracting rate is too small
from a welfare-maximising viewpoint.
This result is obvious by just looking at the objective function of the government, (1),
which is its own total expense and not the social cost of waste collection. In order to obtain
the efficient outcome, the central government could provide a certain incentive scheme
that moves q∗ toward the value of q that satisfies (7) so that the local government’s objec-
tive function would become perfectly aligned with the social cost minimization problem.
For instance, the subsidy of αγNW
(αN−γ)(αN+2γ) for each unit of the waste contracted out to a
private firm could achieve this first-best outcome. However, such a scheme may be polit-
ically difficult to implement. Thus, this observation provides a rationale for a society to
promote the contracting-out of municipal waste collection service from the social welfare
perspective.
Based on the results above, furthermore, we can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. A smaller marginal cost of operation for private firms implies a smaller
contract price and a higher contracting-out rate in the equilibrium.
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Proof. From (4) and (6), we can obtain the following comparative statics results with
respect to the firm’s marginal cost, γ:
∂p∗
∂γ
=
α2N
(2γ + αN)2
> 0, (8)
dr∗
dγ
=
−2αN
(2γ + αN)2
< 0. (9)
Thus, a smaller γ leads to a smaller p∗ as well as to a larger r∗. Q.E.D.
This result implies that a variation in the marginal cost of collecting waste by contractors
in different municipalities could be a driving force behind the empirical finding that the
p∗and r∗are inversely correlated.
In addition, a similar relationship can be obtained as regards a variation in N , which
is the number of private contractors in a market.
Proposition 3. An increase in the number of contractors implies a smaller contract
price and a higher contracting-out rate in the equilibrium.
Proof. From (4) and (6), we can easily obtain the following comparative statics results:
∂p∗
∂N
=
−α2γW
(2γ + αN)2
< 0, (10)
dr∗
dN
=
2αN
(2γ + αN)2
> 0. (11)
Thus, an increase in N leads to a smaller p∗ as well as to a larger r∗. Q.E.D.
Therefore, a variation in the numbers of contractors in respective markets can also induce
the inverse relationship between p∗and r∗.
In a sense, the last result implies that a more open market, in terms of a greater
number of operating firms, would witness a higher contracting-out rate and a lower price.
In our particular context where, even in the long run, the operating cost involves a lump-
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sum component, such as somewhat regulated wages for workers on long-term contracts,
however, the openness of a market would be represented more fundamentally by the
magnitude of this lump-sum cost. We can observe from (4) and (6) that, in this case
with a fixed number of firms, the lump-sum cost of operation for private firms, η, do
not play any role in the determinations of p∗ and r∗ because it is considered sunk in the
short run. Below, we endogenise the value of N by considering a long-run equilibrium of
this market and offer an alternative explanation for the negative correlation between the
contract price and the rate of contracting-out.
3.2 The Case with an Endogenous Number of Firms
In this subsection, we extend the model above by endogenising the number of contractors,
N . Here, we simply apply the zero-profit condition in order to determine the long-term
equilibrium number of the firms in a market. Given the equilibrium values of p∗and q∗,
the profit of each contractor in this subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, pi∗ is:
pi∗ =
(
αγ
2γ + αN
)2
· W
2
γ
− γ
2
·
(
α
2γ + αN
)2
·W 2 − η. (12)
By setting pi∗ = 0 and solving for N , we obtain the equilibrium number of contractors
operating in this market, N∗∗, as:
N∗∗ = W
√
γ
2η
− 2γ
α
. (13)
Now, we substitute (13) into N in (4) and (6) to obtain the equilibrium contract price
(p∗∗) and contracting-out rate (r∗∗) in the case where that the number of contractor is
endogenously determined by the zero-profit condition. After some manipulations, these
values can be obtained as follows:
p∗∗ =
√
2γη, (14)
r∗∗ = 1− 2
√
2γη
αW
. (15)
Based on these results, we can derive the following proposition that indicates a varia-
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tion in η can indeed be a cause of the inverse relationship between the rate of contracting-
out and the contracting price.
Proposition 4. A smaller lump-sum cost of waste collection by a contractor implies
a smaller contract price and a higher contracting-out rate in the long-run equilibrium.
Proof. From (14) and (15), we can easily obtain the following comparative statics re-
sults:
∂p∗∗
∂η
=
√
γ
2η
> 0, (16)
dr∗∗
dη
= − 1
αW
·
√
2γ
η
< 0. (17)
Thus, a smaller η leads to a smaller p∗∗ as well as to a larger r∗∗.Q.E.D.
Thus, a larger lump-sum cost of waste collection by a private firm creates a taller bar-
rier against a potential firm’s entering this specific market as this cost is essentially a
variable cost in the long run and incurred immediately as a firm enters the market. In
some municipalities in Japan, a significant share of a larger η could stem from additional
labour-related costs due to the specific circumstances surrounding the waste collection
business. One of the most notable examples would be the discrimination-related costs in
certain municipalities mainly in the western part of Japan.
4 Discussion
Whereas we have identified several potential sources that could lead to the inverse rela-
tionship between the contract price and the rate of contracting-out, we have not discussed
yet why the contract price goes up as the rate becomes sufficiently close to 100% as it
appears to be the case from the plotted data in Figure 1. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this observation has never been reported in previous empirical studies, much less
investigated analytically. As we mentioned in Introduction, those empirical studies have
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mainly focused on the comparisons of the collection costs between fully-public and fully-
contracted-out entities and, in our opinion, left some intriguing phenomena, such as this
one, unexplored.
Unfortunately, the model in the previous section is not qualified to account for this
observation mainly because of its simplicity. Instead of revising the model by incorporat-
ing some additional traits into the current model, here we merely discuss one possibility
that causes this particular observation: a kind of hold-up situation.12 Household wastes
need to be hauled away within a fairly short time-frame, usually weekly or twice weekly,
for reasons of general health and sanitation. Once a municipal government fully contracts
out its waste collection services to private firms and gets rid of its internal unit entirely,
over time it could lose certain relevant information as regards the costs of collection in
one specific municipality. This could create an environment where a private firm is able
to make a better case for a higher contract price, leading to a shift in bargaining positions
toward the private firm’s advantage. A private firm might even threaten to go on a strike
unless the contract price is raised.13 Such a hold-up situation would be more likely to
pose a serious problem with a fewer number of potential contractors in a market, because
then market forces could not completely wipe out the effect of such a false claim and also
because firms are easier to collude to raise a tender price. Domberger and Jensen (1997)
write, “[c]ontracting out is likely to be more (less) successful whenever the availability
of competitive supply in the market, both actual or potential, is large (small)”. The
argument here is yet another support for this claim.
In the presence of this possibility, a more sophisticated local government might fear the
contingency that it is held up by contractors and decide to keep a larger portion of waste
collecting operation internally than its simple expenditure-minimisation would justify.
As we can see in Figure 1 and 2, there are many municipalities that choose quite high
percentages of contracting-out, but still retain a fairly small share of internal provision of
waste collection services. The hold-up possibility that they could potentially face is one
12This is a completely different kind of hold up situation that has been discussed in the literature.
Domberger and Jensen (1997) mentioned that the public ownership of the assets, such as specialized
vehicles, and the existence of “relation-specific investments” that are sunk expenditures by the contractor
results in under-investment, following a more general argument by Hart (1995).
13On the contrary, civil servants are banned from striking in Japan.
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probable rationale for cutting down on the rate of contracting-out for municipalities.
From a viewpoint of social welfare, though, the potential existence of such an incentive
would provide an additional reason why the contracting-out needs to be encouraged even
more strongly because, while the hold-up issue can discourage a local government to
contract out, it will not directly change the actual cost of collection services as long
as the amount of waste is fixed. That is, from a society’s perspective as a whole, a
local government should ignore this issue altogether, along with revising its expenditure-
oriented objective.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we first reported the three main findings of our survey on the contracting-
out of household waste collection services in Japan: 1) the rate of contracting-out and the
contract price are inversely related, 2) this inverse relationship tapers out as the contract-
ing rate becomes sufficiently high, and the contract price even goes up as the contracting
rate approaches 100%, and 3) there is a significant disparity in the contracting rates
between the eastern and western parts of Japan. Then, by setting up a simple analyti-
cal model, we demonstrated that the the first and third observations can be attributed
to a variation in the lump-sum costs of conducting waste collection services by private
contractors. Also, we briefly discussed that the second observation can be a result of a
potential hold-up situation that could arise when the services are completely contracted
out to private contractors.
We can derive two main policy implications from this study. Both the expenditure-
saving motive of a municipal government and the potential hold-up issue discourage the
government from contracting out its waste collection services, resulting in an insufficient
rate of contracting from the social welfare perspective. In order to counter these effects,
a stronger support from the central government, even the provision of a subsidy for
contracting-out, would be justified. Our analysis also indicates that the observation that
the rates of contracting-out in Western Japan is lagging behind those in Eastern Japan in
general is partly attributable to the persistent discrimination against the two particular
groups. According to our analytical result, the abolishment of the discrimination would
14
lead to a lower contract price as well as to a higher rate of contracting, which in turn
contributes to lowering the social cost of collecting household waste.
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